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This study investigates whether firms use deferred tax expense to meet earnings
targets: (1) to avoid an earnings decline and (2) to avoid a loss. The current
study replicates Phillips et al. (2003)’s study, where they found evidence that
firms use deferred tax expense to manage earnings. The study examines the
financial statements prepared for 2001 – 2003 of firms from consumer and
industrial products listed on the first and second board of Bursa Malaysia.
The final sample comprises of 493 firm-years base on the deferred tax expense
reports for the three-year investigation periods, after filtering the outliers at
1st and 99th percentiles. Using Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) earnings
distribution approach, Healy (1985) total accruals and Modified Jones model
abnormal accruals (Dechow et al., 1995), the study finds evidence that firms
use deferred tax expense to avoid a loss. This study also evidenced an increasing
trend of deferred tax liabilities reported by firm from 1990 – 2004. The credit
balance of deferred tax liabilities means firms report book income higher
than taxable income, which indicates the firms’ tax planning strategies by
crystallizing their tax liabilities to the future years.
Keywords: Earnings management, deferred tax expense, deferred tax liabilities,
tax planning.
Introduction
The study examines the usefulness of deferred tax expense in detecting earnings
management in the Malaysian context. This study is a replication of a study
done by Phillips et al. (2003), where the current study investigates the usefulness
to financial statement users of deferred tax expense in identifying whether firms
are seeking to: (1) to avoid reporting an earnings decline and (2) to avoid
reporting a loss.
The tax expense reported in the income statement consists of two components,
current tax expense (tax credit) and deferred tax expense (deferred tax credit).
The current tax expense is the current year tax payable (refundable) by a firm, a
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proxy for tax payable. Whereas, the deferred tax expense (deferred tax credit) is the provision
for future tax payable (tax deductible) by firms and is expected to reverse in the future
period(s). The Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 25 (MASB 25) requires that all
temporary differences between income tax reporting on the financial statements and on
the tax returns should be accounted for in the financial statements. Temporary differences
arise between the periods in which transactions affect accounting income, and the periods
in which they affect taxable income (for example, different rates use in providing
depreciation and capital allowance). These temporary differences give rise to a tax
difference between periods. Temporary differences originate in one period, and will reverse
in one or more subsequent periods. Permanent differences arise because items that are
reflected on the income statement are never permitted on the income tax return (for example,
disallowable expenses and exempt income).
Earnings management is accomplished through managerial discretion over accounting
choices and operating cash flow (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The underlying assumption
in preparing the financial statements is that managers exercise discretion to manage the
book income upward without increasing the taxable income (Mills and Newberry, 2001).
These activities will generate book-tax income differences. Higher deferred tax expense
(DTE) means the magnitude of differences between book-tax incomes, which indicates
the increasing probability of managing earnings to avoid reporting an earnings decline
and a loss. Therefore, DTE is useful for detecting earnings management.
A study on the usefulness of DTE in detecting earnings management is new in earnings
management research. Phillips et al. (2003) are the first to detect earnings management
activities using DTE. Therefore, this study attempts to find evidence whether Malaysian
firms use DTE to manage earnings in meeting the earnings targets: (1) to avoid an earnings
decline and (2) to avoid a loss. The study examines financial statements of firms prepared
for the years 2001 to 2003 from consumer and industrial products listed on Bursa Malaysia.
The final sample comprises of 493 firm-years. The study adopts Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) earnings distribution approach to detect earnings management firms (and vice
versa). The Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) is also used for detecting earnings
management using accruals. This will enable the study to examine firms’ earnings
management behaviour using two accounting variables: (1) deferred tax expense and (2)
discretionary accruals.
Objectives, Scope and Significance of the Study
The purpose of the study is to examine the extent to which provisions of deferred tax
expense are used as a vehicle to manage earnings through taxes on continuing operations.
This study also examines whether firms use discretionary accruals to manage earnings. In
terms of scope, the study only examines deferred tax expense of firms from consumer and
industrial products listed on the first and second board of Bursa Malaysia. The
investigation periods include only financial statements prepared for the years 2001, 2002
and 2003. The use of accounting choices for the purpose of tax planning strategies is
beyond the scope of this study.
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It is noted that detecting earnings management is important in assessing the quality of
earnings which is useful to financial analysts in the examination of financial reports.
Therefore, this study makes methodological contributions to earnings management
research by providing evidence on a specific accrual used to manage earnings. Furthermore,
this issue has important policy implications on the reported income in light of the self-
assessment tax system. The result of this study can provide an input to the tax authorities
(for tax audit purposes) whether book income is managed in such a way that it does not
affect taxable income (or vice-versa).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section Two discusses the previous
studies on earnings management and deferred tax. Section Three describes the research
framework, collection of data and research models used in this study. Section Four analyses
the findings and the conclusion is presented in Section Five.
Previous Research
As cited in Beneish (2001, p. 4), Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987) defined earnings
management as the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraint of generally
accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.
Whereas, Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as occurring when
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on
reported accounting numbers’. Earnings management practices can be designed either
to assist managers in fulfilling their obligations to stakeholders or to deceive investors
(Magrath and Weld, 2002). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and accounting
profession acknowledge that some earnings management techniques are not fraudulent
(Magrath and Weld, 2002). It is noted that firms have long used earnings management to
smooth earnings.
Earnings management is accomplished through managerial discretion over accounting
choices and operating cash flows (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Discretion over accruals
generally is less observable than management’s choice of accounting methods and less
costly to implement than altering operating cash flows. Thus, researchers have increasingly
used accruals variables to detect earnings management. For example, Healy (1985) uses
total accruals to proxy for discretionary (i.e. abnormal) accruals, while Jones (1991) estimates
regressions of total accruals variables on factors reflecting changes in a firm’s economic
environment to detect earnings management, and uses the residuals to proxy for abnormal
accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model to allow for the possibility that
managers use discretion to accrue revenues when it is questionable whether revenue
recognition criteria have been met.
The financial analyst and tax professionals are beginning to scrutinize tax expense as a
source of earnings management to increase firms’ value (Dhaliwal et al., 2003). The tax
expense is one of the last accounts closed before earnings are announced, thus it provides
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a final opportunity for earnings management. Dhaliwal et al. (2003) used ETR model on a
sample of 4,656 firm-years from 1986 to 1999. They found evidence that firms managed tax
expense to achieve an earnings target.
Previous studies have examined the deferred tax assets valuation allowance and earnings
management and have found mixed evidence of earnings management activities via
valuation allowance (Visvanathan 1998, Bauman et al. 2001 and Chia et al. 2004). Phillips et
al. (2003) are the first to examine earnings management using deferred tax expense. Deferred
tax expense can be used to better measure managers’ discretionary choices under generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) because the tax law, in general, allows less
discretion in accounting choices relative to the discretion that exist under GAAP (Mills
and Newberry 2001, Manzon and Plesko 2002, Hanlon 2002, and Phillips et al. 2003).
Hence, they expect that managers seek to manage earnings to achieve earnings targets,
and do so by exploiting the greater discretion they have for financial reporting compared
to tax reporting. Moreover, it is assumed that managers prefer to manage book income
upward without increasing taxable income. Thus, the exercise of managerial discretion to
manage income upward should generate temporary book-tax differences, and, hence,
deferred tax expense will be useful in detecting earnings management.
Research Methodology
Research Framework
Figure 3.1 presents the research framework of this study. The study adopts Burgstahler
and Dichev’s (1997) earnings distribution approach to detect earnings management firms
(and vice versa). The computation of total accruals is based on Healy’s model (1985). The
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) is used for detecting earnings management
using accruals. The study then examines the existence of earnings management in deferred
tax expense and accruals between the sample firms (earnings management firms) and
control firms (non-earnings management firms).
Hypotheses Development
As stated by Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management is accomplished through
managerial discretion over the accounting choices and operating cash flow. Following
Mills and Newberry (2001), the underlying assumption in preparing the financial statements
is that managers exercise discretion to manage the book income upward without increasing
the taxable income. These activities will generate book-tax income difference, which is
reflected in deferred tax expense reported in the financial statements. Deferred tax expense
is a likely tool for earnings management because changes in deferred tax expense affect
income from continuing operations, and unlike other accruals, the deferred tax accounting
considers future profitability of the firm as a whole, which involves a good deal of
subjectivity (Visvanathan, 1998). Hence, deferred tax expense is a proxy for the book-tax
income differences that reflect managerial discretion to detect earnings management.
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Higher deferred tax expense shows the magnitude of the differences between book-tax
incomes, thus, indicating the increasing probability of managing earnings to avoid
reporting an earnings decline or a loss.
Previous studies provided evidence that managers use accruals to meet earnings target
(Beneish, 2001). According to Beneish (2001), three methods have been used by
researchers to evaluate the existence of earnings management: (1) aggregate accruals and
uses of regression models to calculate expected and unexpected accruals; (2) specific
accruals such as provision of bad debts and provision of deferred taxation; and (3)
discontinuities in the distribution of earnings (Beneish, 2001, p. 5). Amongst the established
accruals models that have been used by the previous researchers in earnings management
studies are the Jones (1991) model, Healy (1985) total accruals model and Modified Jones
(Dechow et al., 1995) model. Thus, to be consistent with Phillips et al. (2003), this study
also examines the existence of earnings management using discretionary accruals.
Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested:
H1a: Deferred tax expense detects earnings management concerned with avoiding an
earnings decline.
H1b: Discretionary accrual detects earnings management concerned with avoiding an
earnings decline.
H2a: Deferred tax expense detects earnings management concerned with avoiding a
loss.
H2b: Discretionary accrual detects earnings management concerned with avoiding a
loss.
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Figure 3.1: Research Framework
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Sample Selection
The first part of the study examines the trend of deferred tax balances (net of deferred tax
assets and deferred tax liabilities) reported by firms from 1990 to 2004. This involves a
sample from consumer and industrial products from first and second board of Bursa
Malaysia. The purpose is to look at the trend and the magnitude of deferred tax balances
reported by firms since the adoption of deferred tax accounting in Malaysia (Pang et al.,
1994 reported deferred tax balances from 1983 to 1989).
The focus of the study is to examine the deferred tax expense reported by firms in the
financial statements. All the financial accounting variables used in this study are obtained
from Thomson data stream as reported in Table 3.1, except for deferred tax expense, for
which the data are hand collected from the firms’ financial statements’ footnotes. To
reduce the cost of collecting deferred tax expense footnote data, the study only examines
firms from consumer and industrial products traded on the main and second board of
Bursa Malaysia. The investigation periods include financial statements prepared for the
years 2001, 2002 and 2003. As stated by Hribar and Collins (2002), the cross sectional
estimation approach does not require a time-series for each company, thus, the benchmark
for each company’s accruals is the behaviour of other companies in the sample. Therefore,
the three-years test periods to examine earnings management activities using cross-
sectional approach is justifiable.
The study begins with a sample of firm-years in the Thomson data stream that have non-
missing deferred tax expense for the three-year test periods 2001 – 2003 as presented in
Table 3.2. To control for extreme observations, firm-years having deferred tax expense
below the 1st percentile or above 99th percentile are deleted. This results in a final sample
of 493 firm-year observations. Since the sample includes firms of varying size, all variables
are scaled by the total assets, except for net income which is scaled at market value of
equity (to be consistent with Phillips et al., 2003’s study).
Variables Data Stream Code
Deferred tax credit balances DT 3263
Net income NI 154
Market value equity MVE MV
Total assets TA 2999
Earnings before extraordinary item and interest EBIT 154
Sales Sales 104
Accounts receivable AR 2051
Property, Plant and Equipment PPE 2501
Cash flow from operations CFO 1015
Table 3.1:  Variables Extracted from Data Stream
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Earnings Management and Accrual Models
The study adopts Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) earnings distribution approach to
detect   earnings management, Healy (1985) for total accruals and Modified Jones model
for abnormal accruals (Dechow et al., 1995).
Earnings Management Model
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) Earnings Distribution Approach (earnings after
management) detects firms that managed earnings and control firms i.e. firms that do not
manage earnings. The study considers two situations in which earnings management is
likely to present: (1) firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings changes i.e. earnings
management to avoid an earnings decline; and (2) firm-years with zero or slightly positive
earnings level i.e. earnings management to avoid a loss.
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), the first setting for earnings management to
avoid an earnings decline is: EM1 equals 1 (EM1 = 1 for earnings management firms)  if a
firm reports a scaled earnings change in year t greater than or equal to zero and less than
0.01 of its beginning-of-year  t – 1 market value of equity. Alternatively, EM1 equals 0 (EM1
= 0 for non-earnings management firms or control firms) if a firm reports a scaled earnings
change in year t greater than or equal to -0.01 and less than 0 of its beginning-of-year
t – 1 market value of equity.
The second setting is earnings management to avoid a loss: EM2 equals 1 (EM2 = 1 for
earnings management firms) if a firm reports a scaled earnings of at least 0 and less than
0.02 of its beginning-of-year t – 1 market value of equity. Alternatively, EM2 equals 0 (EM2
= 0 for non-earnings management firms or control firms) if a firm reports a scaled earnings
of at least -0.02 and less than 0 of its beginning-of-year t – 1 market value of equity.
Total Accruals
The current study also examines whether firms use accruals to manage earnings in meeting
earnings targets using Healy’s (1985) total accruals. Total accruals are income before
extraordinary items (EBEI) minus cash flows from operations (CFO) as stated in the
equation (1) below.  All variables are scaled by total assets at the end of year t – 1.
Table 3.2: Selection of Sample
Consumer products 126 firms
Industrial products 270 firms
                                         Total 396 firms
No of firm-years (for 3 years) 1188 firm-years
Missing DTE data 290 firm-years
Outliers (1st and 99th percentiles) 405 firm-years
Final Observations 493 firm-years
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TAcc = EBEI – CFO (1)
Abnormal Accruals Model
The discretionary accruals (DAcc) are computed using the Modified Jones model (Dechow
et al., 1995). It is calculated as the difference between total accruals and normal accruals.
Under the Modified Jones Model, normal accruals are estimated using control firm-years
(EM = 0) as stated in the equation (2) below:
TAccit  = ? + ?1 (?Salesit ) + ?2PPEit (2)
where ?Sales is the change in the firm’s sales from t – 1 to year t, and PPE is gross
property, plant and equipment. All variables are scaled by total assets at the year end,
t – 1. For each earnings management firm (EM = 1), the study uses an estimated parameter
derived from equation (2) above to compute its abnormal accruals using equation 3
below:
TAccit  = ? + ?1 (?Salesit  - ?RECit ) + ?2PPEit  + €+ (3)
Research Findings
Deferred Tax Credit Balances
An examination of the deferred tax credit balances (net of deferred tax liabilities and
deferred tax assets) reported by firms from the industrial products and consumer products
evidences an increasing trend from 1990 to 2004. When the standard, a MASB 25 was
introduced in January 1983, only 44.8 percent of the public listed companies had adopted
deferred tax accounting, and this percentage had increased to 77.8 percent in 1989 (Pang
et al.,1994). Figure 4.1 depicts the mean of deferred tax credit balances which shows a
slight increase in 1999 due to the tax waiver year announced by the government for
income 1999. The study also evidences drastic increases in deferred tax credit balances
for 2003 and 2004. This is due to the new standard, i.e., MASB 25 Income Taxes, which
required firms to use the liability method of deferred tax accounting effective from July
2002. This scenario shows that firms are complying with the new standard of accounting
for deferred taxation.
Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline
Figure 4.2 presents the identification of earnings management firms and non-earnings
management firms using Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) earnings distribution approach.
EM1 equals 1 (EM1 = 1 for earnings management firms)  if a firm reports a scaled earnings
change in year t greater than or equal to zero and less than 0.01 of its beginning-of-year
t – 1 market value of equity. On the other hand, EM1 equals 0 (EM1 = 0 for non-earnings
management firms) if a firm reports a scaled earnings change in year t greater than or equal
to -0.01 and less than 0 of its beginning-of-year t – 1 market value of equity.  The unusually
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high number of observations in the zero and slightly positive earnings change interval
(i.e. 68 firm-years or 13.8 percent out of 493 firm-years), and the slightly lower frequency
of observations in the slightly negative earnings change interval (i.e. 65 firm-years or 13.2
percent out of 493 firm-years) are similar to the results found by Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) and Phillips et al. (2003).
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Earnings Management to Avoid a Loss
In the second setting of earnings management to avoid a loss as presented in Figure 4.3,
EM2 equals 1 (EM2 = 1 for earnings management firms) if a firm reports a scaled earnings
of at least 0 and less than 0.02 of its beginning-of-year t – 1 market value of equity (71 firm-
years or 15.8 percent out of 450 firm-years). Alternatively, EM2 equals 0 (EM2 = 0 for non-
earnings management firms) if a firm reports a scaled earnings of at least -0.02 and less
than 0 of its beginning-of-year t – 1 market value of equity (24 firm-years or 5.3 percent out
of 450 firm-years).
Figure 4.3: Frequency of Firms Across Intervals of Scaled Earnings
Deferred Tax Expense to Avoid an Earnings Decline
Figure 4.4 presents a histogram of deferred tax expense mean scaled by earnings change
intervals that have a width of 0.01 of the market value and range from -0.10 to 0.10. The
deferred tax expense mean for the -0.01 to less than 0 interval (the control sample EM1= 0)
is 0.0010, whereas the mean deferred tax expense is 0.0014 in the zero and slightly positive
earnings change intervals (the test sample EM1= 1). The result shows that deferred tax
expense mean is higher for firm-years that just avoid earnings decline i.e. earnings
management sample firms.
Deferred Tax Expense to Avoid a Loss
Figure 4.5 presents a histogram of the mean of deferred tax expense scaled by earnings
level. The scaled earnings intervals have a width of 0.01 of market value and range from –
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0.10 to 0.10 (EM2 = 1). Likely due to the tax benefits of losses, the mean deferred tax
expense is negative for loss intervals, and becomes positive when earnings are zero or
slightly positive. Again, the result is similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Phillips
et al. (2003).
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Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the comparison of firm-years with zero or slightly
positive earnings changes vs. firm-years with slightly negative earnings changes
(Hypotheses 1). For the EM1 = 1 sample, the mean deferred tax expense is 0.0014 or 0.14
percent of beginning-of-year total assets (median = 0.0005), with values ranging from
-0.68 percent to 1.68 percent of total assets. The mean total accruals (TAcc) is 0.0098 or
0.98 percent of the beginning-of-year total assets, and the range is from -15.81 percent to
115.14 percent. However, the mean discretionary accruals (DAcc) is positive and higher
than mean deferred tax expense i.e. 0.0055 or 0.55 percent of the beginning-of-year total
assets. The result is inconsistent with the findings discovered by Phillips et al. (2003).
The result implies that the EM1 sample firms did not utilize deferred tax expense to manage
earnings.
Where,
? EM1 = 1 for zero and slightly positive earnings changes and EM1 = 0 for slightly
negative earnings changes;
? EM1 = 1 for firm-years have scaled  earnings changes [(Nit – Nit-1)/MVEt-1] of at least
0 and Less than 0.01;
? EM1 = 0 for firm-years have scaled earnings changes of at least –0.01 and less than 0.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics Earnings Management to Avoid an Earnings Decline
EM1 = 1 n Mean Std Deviation Maximum Minimum
DTE 68 0.0014 0.0042 0.0168 -0.0068
TAcc 68 0.0098 0.1656 1.1514 -0.1581
DAcc 68 0.0055 0.2731 1.8091 -0.5718
?CFO 68 0.0038 0.1087 0.3346 -0.6296
EM1 = 0
DTE 65  0.0010 0.0063 0.0175 -0.0313
TAcc 65 -0.0079 0.0561 0.1543 -0.1423
DAcc 65 -0.0141 0.0892 0.2727 -0.2192
?CFO 65  0.0086 0.0806 0.3835 -0.2367
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND DEFERRED TAX
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Variable definitions:
DTE = Deferred tax expense scaled by the total assets at the end of year t – 1
TAcc = Total accruals scaled by total assets at the end of year t – 1, is computed as
EBEI  less CFO, where  EBEI  income before extraordinary items and  CFO is
cash flows from operations.
DAcc = Discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et
al., 1995). It is calculated as the difference between TAcc and normal accruals.
Modified Jones Model normal accruals are estimated as TAccit  = ? + ?1 (?Salesit
– ?RECit ) +  ?2PPEit  where ?Sales is the change in the firm’s sales from t – 1 to
year t, and PPE is gross property, plant and equipment. All variables are scaled
by total assets at the year end of t – 1.
CFO  = Cash flow from operations from year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year
t – 1.
In the just-missed control sample i.e. EM1 = 0, the mean DTE is 0.0010 (median = 0.0001)
and negative means for both total accruals (TAcc) and discretionary accruals (DAcc) that
are -0.0079 (or -0.79 percent) and -0.0141 (or -1.41 percent) respectively, of the beginning-
of-year total assets. The result is consistent with Phillips et al. (2003). However, the mean
change in cash flow from operation (?CFO) is positive 0.0086 or 0.86 percent of the
beginning-of-year total assets, which is higher than the mean ?CFO EM1 = 1, thus,
reverse from the results found by Phillips et al. (2003).
Table 4.2 presents the univariate analysis for Hypotheses 1. The statistical test compares
the two samples on a univariate basis (p-values are two-tailed). The study expects that if
firms manage earnings upward to avoid reporting an earnings decline, then earnings
management metrics should reflect this activity. In particular, the study expects greater
deferred tax expense and greater accrual values in earnings management firm-years than
in control firm-years. The results indicate that the mean deferred tax expense is larger in
the EM1 = 1 sample of firm-years that just avoid an earnings decline than in just-missed
control sample EM1 = 0. However, the difference is not significant. The study also observes
larger mean total accruals (TAcc) and discretionary accruals (DAcc) for the EM1 = 1 firm-
years. This indicates that firms use discretionary accruals (DAcc) to avoid an earnings
decline. However, the amount is not significant.
Table 4.2: Univariate Analysis Earnings Management to Avoid an
Earnings Decline
EM1 = 1 EM1 = 0
Mean Mean F-value P-value
DTE 0.0014  0.0010 0.139 0.710
TAcc 0.0098 -0.0079 0.666 0.416
DAcc 0.0055 -0.0141 0.304 0.582
?CFO 0.0038  0.0086 0.083 0.773
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Earnings Management to Avoid a Loss
Table 4.3 and 4.4 present descriptive statistics and univariate analysis for Hypotheses 2,
where the study examines whether firms use deferred tax expense to avoid a loss (EM2).
Consistent with deferred tax expense identifying earnings management activity to avoid
a loss, the mean deferred tax expense is 0.0118 (median = 0.0114) for the earnings interval
of 0 to less than 0.02 of the market value of equity is significantly greater than the mean
deferred tax expense  -0.0089 (median = -0.0091) for the just-missed control sample. The
positive (negative) mean deferred tax expense indicates an average deferred tax expense
(benefit), which implies that the average firm in EM2 = 1 earnings levels samples reports
book income higher than taxable income. This indicates that Malaysian firms use deferred
tax expense to manage earnings. The study also evidences the use of discretionary
accruals to avoid a loss.
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics Earnings Management to Avoid a Loss
EM2 = 1 n Mean Std Deviation Maximum Minimum
DTE 71  0.0118 0.0059 0.0200  0.0012
TAcc 71 -0.0049 0.1011 0.6239 -0.3121
DAcc 71 -0.0097 0.2824 1.1062 -1.3507
CFO 71  0.0058 0.1181 0.7029 -0.3397
EM2 = 0
DTE 24 -0.0089 0.0058 0.0007 -0.0172
TAcc 24 -0.0926 0.2529 0.0806 -0.9658
DAcc 24 -0.2989 1.0634 0.0927 -5.2129
CFO 24  0.0003 0.0600 0.1242 -0.1518
Where,
? EM2 = 1 for zero and slightly positive earnings and EM2 = 0 for slightly negative
earnings;
? EM2 = 1 for firm-years have scaled earnings [(Nit/MVEt-1)] of at least 0 and less than
0.02 ;
? EM2 = 0 firm-years have scaled earnings of at least –0.02 and less than 0.
Variable definitions:
DTE    =  Deferred tax expense scaled by the total assets at the end of year t – 1.
TAcc = Total accruals scaled by total assets at the end of year t – 1, is computed as
EBEI  less CFO, where  EBEI  income before extraordinary items and  CFO is
cash flows from operations.
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DAcc  = Discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et
al., 1995). It is calculated as the difference between TAcc and normal accruals.
Modified Jones Model normal accruals are estimated as TAccit  = ? + ?1  (?Salesit
- ?RECit ) + ?2PPEit  where ?Sales is the change in the firm’s sales from t – 1 to
year t, and PPE is gross property, plant and equipment. All variables are scaled
by total assets at the year end of t – 1.
CFO = Cash flow from operations from year t, scaled by total assets at the end of
year t.
Table 4.4: Univariate Analysis Earnings Management to Avoid a Loss
EM2 = 1 EM2 = 0
Mean Mean t-statistic P-value
DTE  0.0118 -0.0089 221.594 0.000* 
TAcc -0.0049 -0.0926 5.874  0.017**
DAcc -0.0097 -0.2989 4.416  0.038**
CFO  0.0058  0.0003 0.048 0.827
*   Significant at 0.01
** Significant at 0.05
Conclusions
The study investigates the usefulness of deferred tax expense in detecting earnings
management to meet firms’ earnings targets: (1) to avoid an earnings decline and (2) to
avoid a loss. The results are based on the two sectors (consumer and industrial products)
and three years of   investigation periods (2001 to 2003). The statistical test results show
that firms use deferred tax expense and discretionary accruals to avoid a loss. However,
the results do not support that firms use deferred tax expense and discretionary accruals
to avoid an earnings decline. This study contributes to earnings management literature
and variables that can be used to investigate earnings management activities.
This study also evidenced an increasing trend of deferred tax liabilities reported by firms
from 1990 – 2004. This shows a growing gap between book and taxable income, which
means that firms are deferring its tax liabilities to the future. Prior studies have also
documented a growing gap between book and taxable income since 1990 (Desai 2002,
Manzon and Plesko 2002, Hanlon 2002 and Frank et al. 2004). This scenario indicates that
firms have undertaken aggressive tax planning strategies by reporting higher income to
shareholders and lower taxable income to tax authorities (Frank et al., 2004). This is an
important issue that needs to be addressed especially with respect to the degradtion of
quality of profit reporting by firms (Hanlon, 2002). Therefore, future studies should
investigate and provide evidence in this aspect.
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